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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case gravitates around an undisputed Contractwherein 
Apple's agreed to buy O'Dell's catering equipment in July, 2001, 
with the purchase price of $340,000.00 secured by the equipment. 
See Verified Complaint, Clerk's Record on Appeal, [CRA], CRA p.1 
and p. 65, section 9, Plaintiff's Affidavit of David Orr; CRA 
p.224, District Court's Memorandum Decision]. Then, claiming a 
"Modification" to the original agreement occurred, Respondent's 
Complaint purports that the acceptance and cashing of check no. 
469 marked 'final payment" on June 10, 2003, perfected an Accord 
And Satisfaction, CIiA Verified Complaint 14, reducingthe 
purchase price some $165,000.00, at Respondent's verified 
Complaint at CRA 3, line 11. 
However, the facts in this case developed to show that 
Respondent failed to provide any competent evidence that the 
Appellant actually received the check, necessary for notice of an 
Accord and Satisfaction; instead, it is clear itself from the 
examination of the check, that the check itself was presented at 
the Respondent's bank in Ketchum, Id, for a direct bank transfer. 
See Affidavit of Appellant Thomas O'Dell, p. 180, CRA, denying 
receipt of the check. There in fact was no Accord and 
Satisfaction, as Appellant had no proper notice of the check 
served nor delivered upon him. 
See also Appellant's Exhibit A, p. 41, showing on the back 
of the check a stamp from the Ketchum Branch, Ketchum Idaho, and 
scrawlings, yet to be identified as to signator "For Deposit 
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Only" showing patently from the back of the check that the check 
was not mailed to Appellant, but that an attempt was made at an 
Accord through the writing on the face. See also a document at 
p. 155, CRA, entitled ~laintiff's/[Respondent's] Exhibit C, 
purporting to be mailed to Mr. Thomas O'Dell, Arco, Idaho", no 
zip code. 
To support it's decision the District court relied 
exclusively upon the affidavit of Respondent David Orr for 
Apple's Mobile Catering, "that he had problems with the 
equipment, and to resolve the issue, he and Mr O'Dell made an 
oral modification to their original agreement". Emphasis added. 
CRA Memorandum Decision, p. 225. See affidavit of Tom O'Dell, p. 
1, flatly denying that he had ever seen nor personally received 
check No. 469 from David W. Orr, listing a purported "Final 
Payment" designation for that $15,000.00 check, CRA, 180, and 
that he never actually saw the check until sometime in 2006. 
This denial should have created a genuine issue of material fact 
as to the existence of any "oral Modification" so that O'Dell's 
sales price would be reduced by $165,000.00. Instead, the Court 
summarily, but improperly, finds the Modification through some 
Course of Performance. 
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COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Respondent originally filed this Case in Bingham County 
and asserted some elements of an Accord and Satisfaction as his 
main theory he had satisfied Apple's Mobile Catering's 
contractual obligations to Appellant, but a change of Venue 
Stipulation properly removed the case to Custer County, where the 
Appellant has always lived and done business. It is noteworthy 
that the assertion of an Accord and Satisfaction by Respondent 
procedurally places a Defense of an Accord and Satisfaction as a 
method of discharging contract or cause of action defense as the 
gravamen of their case in chief. This position anticipates 
Appellant's assertion of the contract and the Statute of Frauds 
requirement for a writing, placing it squarely in Respondent's 
case in chief, and subjecting his case to those defenses 
affirmatively. 
The Appellant's Answer of January 4th ,  2 0 0 8 ,  was followed by 
a period of delays caused by Appellant's two Bankruptcy filings 
and the Automatic Stay Granted thereon, the first of January 
30th, 2 0 0 8  [ when Appellant filed his first Bankruptcy Petition 
through the office of this attorney, and the second pro se filing 
by Mr. O'Dell on June 23rd, 2 0 0 8 ,  after dismissal of the first 
case. See p. 166, Appellant's Objection To Notice of Admissions 
Deemed Admitted, line 4.1 
The Appellant, not aware of the pro se Bankruptcy filing of 
his client, filed his first Motion and Memorandum for Summary 
Judgment on June 3 0 ,  2 0 0 8 ,  and the Court got the case back on 
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track following the August 20, 2008 dismissal of the second 
Bankruptcy, and called up the case for calendaring On August 
27'" 2008, with the court Ordering the parties to complete 
filing Summary Judgment by October 15th, 2008. 
The Respondent filed its motion for Summary Judgment on 
September 12, 2008, and Appellant stood upon his June 30m, 2008, 
filing of Summary Judgment. Respondent filed it's reply 
Memorandum is Support of It's Motion for Summary Judgment on 
October 9th, 2008, CRA 169-173, and Appellant Filed it's 
Responsive Memorandum on October 28, 2008. On November 18'", 
2008 court issued its Decision Re: Pending Summary Judgment 
Motions. On December 2"', 2008, Appellant filed it's Motion to 
Set Aside the Court's Ruling On Summary Judgment, and on December 
16, 2008, the Court filed it's Order Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Consider, from which this Notice of Appeal issued on January 
28. 2009. 
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v. THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S OPENING' 
BRIEF 6 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO THE PLAINTIFF, WHEN IN FACT FROM THE FACE OF THE DECISION, THE 
COURT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, APPEARING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
11. DO SUFFICIENT FACTS EXIST FOR WHICH A REASONABLE JURY 
COULD FIND BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WAS A 
COURSE OF PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
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POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
A Motion for Summary Judgment may be granted "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56 ( c ) 
Idaho Code Section 28-2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS- STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract 
for the sale of goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not 
enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
Idaho Code Section 28-2-202. FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION.-- 
PAROL OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms with respect to which the 
confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are 
otherwise set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are 
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior 
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be 
explained or supplemented 
(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade (section 28-1-303) ; and 
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds 
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. 
IV. 
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND 
WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or 
rescission except by a signed writing, cannot be otherwise 
modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants, such a 
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be signed by 
the other party. (3) The requirements of the Statute of Frauds 
section of this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if 
the contract as modified is within it's provisions. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
I. DID THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
THE RESPONDENT, WHEN IN FACT FROM THE FACE OF THE DECISION, THE 
COURT DENIED THE PLAINTIFF'S THEORY OF AN' ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION, APPEARING TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT? . 
Pursuant to Rule 56 ( c ) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure, a Motion for Summary Judgment may be granted "if the 
pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment 
as a matter of law." 
The party opposing the motion for summary judgment has the 
burden of presenting sufficient evidence to establish whether a 
triable issue of fact exists; however, the Court must construe 
all facts in favor of the party opposing the motion, together 
with all reasonable inferences derived from the evidence. 
Anderson v. City of Pocatello, 112 Idaho 176, 731 P.2d 171 
(1986); Bunker Hill Co. v. United Steelworkers, 107 Idaho 155, 
686 P.2d 835 (1984); Mitchell v. Siquieros, 99 Idaho 396, 582 
P.2d 1074 (1978). Based upon the failure of Respondent to 
prevail upon his main theory of Accord and Satisfaction, the 
Court should have granted Summary Judgment to the Appellant, 
declaring the Respondent owed the unpaid balance of the contract. 
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However, in it's Memorandum Decision of November 18, 2008, 
the court relies exclusively upon the Affidavit of David Orr for 
it's decision, and completely fails to address the Affidavit of 
Thomas O'Dell, flatly denying he personally received check No. 
469 from David W. Orr, listing a "Final Payment" See p. 180, 
Affidavit of Thomas O'Dell, and any awareness of and contract 
modification. 
Appellant in it's motion for Summary Judgment of June 30th, 
2008 mainly focused on Respondent's theory of Accord and 
Satisfaction, as no alternative theory had yet emerged from 
Respondent's pleadings. Then the Statute of Frauds Issue was 
argued again in the Appellant's Responsive Memorandum Supporting 
Motion for Summary Judgment Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. CRA, p. 185. 
11. DO SUFFICIENT FACTS EXIST FOR WHICH A REASONABLE JURY COULD 
FIND BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE, THAT THERE WAS A COURSE 
OF PERFORMANCE EXCEPTION TO THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS? 
The district Court, however, has never properly address the 
Statute of Frauds. It is clear, however, this case is governed 
by the Statute of Frauds, as a $130,000 modification has been 
asserted by the Respondent. The statute merely requires that a 
Contract for the Sale of Goods over $500.00 must be in writing to 
be enforceable, by way of action or defense, unless signed by the 
party against whom enforcement is sought. 
Idaho Code Section 28-2-201. FORMAL REQUIREMENTS- STATUTE OF 
FRAUDS. Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract 
for the sale oE goods for the price of $500.00 or more is not 
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enforceable by way of action or defense unless there is some 
writing sufficient to indicate that a contract for sale has been 
made between the parties and signed by the party against whom 
enforcement is sought or by his authorized agent or broker. 
~t is apparent from the early development in this case that 
Respondent was aware of this requirement, and sought to remedy it 
with an Accord and Satisfaction, that they knowingly attempted 
this as a remedy. See Respondent's Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Support of Its Motions For Summary Judgment, CRA 105, footnote 
one. On this point, there is an obvious factual dispute, as the 
Respondent argues and admits he made some payments by "direct 
deposit to the Defendant's bank account ...g ave Apples his account 
number and Mr. Orr would at times go to a branch of Defendant's 
bank and deposit the finds in Defendant's Account", and that his 
habit was to mail to Defendant by first class mail a copy of the 
check that Mr. Orr deposited. See CRA p. 112. citing David W. 
Orr Affidavit, paragraph 15. 
Compare this directly with the Affidavit of Appellant Thomas 
O'Dell "[tlhat I am the Defendant in this matter, but that 
Plaintiff's assertion in section ( 7 )  of the complaint is totally 
false and without merit, in that I never saw, nor personally 
received check No. 469 from David W. Orr, listing a purported 
"Final Payment" designation for that $15,000 check". CRA, p. 180 
No summary Judgment is proper, if there is a genuine issue of 
material fact, so the court found an alternative theory and based 
it's decision upon oral modification of a written contract. But 
if a contract is within the statute of Frauds, there is still a 
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writing requirement for it's modification. See especially: 
Note that the following code section should have routed the 
Court's inquiry into whether or not the contract, as modified, is 
within the provisions of 28-2-201. It is. 
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209. MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND 
WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement which excludes modification or 
rescission except by a signed writing, cannot be otherwise 
modified or rescinded, but except as between merchants, such a 
requirement on a form supplied by the merchant must be signed by 
the other party. (3) The requirements of the Statute of Frauds 
section of this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if 
the contract as modified is within it's provisions. Emphasis 
added. 
In the Court's Memorandum decision the Court also argues 
that Respondent's affidavit is not evidence, declining to see 
Respondent's "legal assertion that the written contract could not 
be modified orally" CRA 226, and disregards Respondent's view of 
the terms. The court failed to recognize there were conflicting 
inferences to be made from the reading and comparison of the 
affidavits of the parties, and left this decision to the jury. 
This is supported by the case law on this point at Loomis v. City 
of Hailev, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), Bonz v. Sudweeks, 
119 Idaho 539, 808 P.2d 876 (1991) and Aid Ins. Co. (Mut. Aid 
Ins. Co. V. Armstroncr), 119 Idaho 897, 811, P.2d 507 (Ct. App. 
Respondents denial of any oral modification and denial of an 
Accord and Satisfaction is a matter of record ignored by the 
District Court. If the record contains conflicting inferences or 
reasonable minds might reach different conclusions, a summary 
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judgment must be denied. Loomis v. City of Haiiev, 119 Idaho 
434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), supra. 
This clearly means that the court may not just rely upon the 
affidavit of one party as Respondent's affidavit has been totally 
ignored by the court, especially when the lower court tried to 
then show a "mutual assent . . .  implied from the parties' actions." 
"Even if a contract has a clause requiring modifications to be in 
writing, such a clause can be waived, either expressly or based 
upon the conduct of the parties." M E M O W U M  DECISION, CRA, 225. 
But this is not permitted by the law and a literal violation of 
the Parol Evidence Rule, below. 
Idaho Code Section 28-2-202. FINAL WRITTEN EXPRESSION.-- 
PAROLE OR EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE. Terms with respect to which the 
confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree or which are 
otherwise set forth in writing intended by the parties as a final 
expression of their agreement with respect to such terms as are 
included therein may not be contradicted by evidence of any prior 
agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement but may be 
explained or supplemented: 
(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade (section 28-1-303); and 
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds 
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Emphasis 
added. 
It must be argued the court did find the writing to have 
been intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the 
terms of the agreement, and improperly then went on to find this 
section somehow waived; from the courts own language, again "Even 
if a contract has a clause requiring modifications must be in 
writing, such a clause can be waived, either expressly or based 
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upon the conduct of the parties," and the Court looks to the 
Course of Performance exception to the Statue of Frauds. CRA p. 
225 See also Affidavit of Thomas O'Dell, notifying the court of 
such a clause and referencing Defendant's Exhibit B, Orr Security 
Agreement. 
At this point the Court should have seen it was looking to 
"evidence of additional terms by course of performance, 
prohibited by this section because the writing was intended by 
the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of 
the agreement," absolutely prohibited by Idaho Code 22-2-202 (b) 
[somehow neither this agreement nor the original contract has 
appeared in the Clerks Record on Appeal]. 
This argument was presented to the court again in 
Respondent's Motion to set aside Court's Ruling on Summary 
Judgment. CRA p. 230. Appellant there argued unsuccessfully 
that where there is conflicting evidence the court may not enter 
summary Judgment; in addition, the where the burden of proving 
the doctrine of part performance to provide an exception to the 
Statute of Frauds, Idaho Courts require proof by Clear and 
Convincing evidence. See Boesiser v. Frier, 85 Idaho 551, 381 
P.2d 802 (1963) . 
At the very least the District Court should have retained 
the case on for Jury trial until this material fact had been 
decided, as this code section appears to make it mandatory the 
court so find, in construing the related statutes to the basic 
Statute of Frauds. The court completely overlooked this further 
APPLE'S MOBILE CATERING, LLC v. THOMAS O'DELL-APPELLANT'S OPENING 
BRIEF 14 
analysis, instead focusing on the course of performance exception 
at section (a). The District court should on remand clearly 
address this issue. It is blatantly apparent from Mr. O'Dell's 
affidavit that this was his intent, and to then see the lower 
court use the unilateral assent of merely one of the parties to 
show a course of performance to improperly modify a contract 
otherwise subject to the Statute of Fraud's requirement for a 
writing is unconscionable and illegal. 
Note in the construction of the Statute how it compels the 
court to make such an inquiry, as that whole two part section may 
be read "[tlerms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda 
of the parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in writing 
intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement 
with respect to such terms as are included therein may not be 
contradicted by evidence of any prior agreement or of a 
contemporaneous oral agreement but may be explained or 
supplemented: 
(a) By course of performance, course of dealing, or usage of 
trade (section 28-1-303) ; and 
(b) By evidence of additional terms, unless the court finds 
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and 
exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement. Emphasis 
added. 
Idaho Code 28-2-202, the Parol Evidence Rule. If in fact the 
court is arguing, as it appears to, that such a clause can be 
waived, either expressly or based upon the conduct of the parties 
at CRA 225 in it's Memorandum Decision, the requirements of 
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section b, supra, appear to prevent that here, as if . . .  "unless 
the court finds the writing to have been intended also as a 
complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreementn. 
Finally, the court should have considered all these code 
sections related to this issues in making it's decision, and this 
one was also completely omitted from the District Court's 
analysis at Idaho Code Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209. 
Idaho Code, Section 28-2-209 
MODIFICATION, RESCISSION, AND WAIVER. (2) A signed agreement 
which excludes modification or rescission except by a signed 
writing, cannot be otherwise modified or rescinded, but except as 
between merchants, such a requirement on a form supplied by the 
merchant must be signed by the other party. (3) The requirements 
of the Statute of Frauds section of this chapter (section 28-2- 
201) must be satisfied if the contract as modified is within it's 
provisions. Emphasis added. 
Again and again and again all the related code sections of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, from the Statute of Frauds at 28-2- 
201, to the Parol Evidence Rule at 28-2-202, to the section at 
28-2-209 on Modification, Rescission and Waiver. As the stated 
purpose and policy of the code is to simplify, clarify, and 
modernize the law governing commercial transactions, Idaho Code 
28-1-103, and as the combined effect of these three or four 
prohibitions against a modificationall appear to require a 
writing on the part of the Appellant not extant in this case, and 
a fatal defect in the Respondents case overlooked by the District 
Court below 
The Court of Appeals of Idaho agrees. In Breeden v. Edmunson, 
689 P.2d 211, 107 Idaho 319,(Court of Appeals 19841, holding that 
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the section on Modification at Idaho Code 28-2-209 requires that 
any modification of the parties written agreement be in writing, 
quoting the operative language from section 28-2-209 which 
provides "The requirements of the statute of frauds section of 
this chapter (section 28-2-201) must be satisfied if the contract 
as modified is within its provisions. 
This appears to be, again, back to the basic Statute of 
Frauds argued here from Idaho Code 28-2-201, a contract over 
$500.00. Most interesting in the Court's analysis is also the 
presentation of the situation here, that although '[ilt was not 
addressed by the court below . . .  Iblecause of the way the issue was 
presented to us, both sides have not had the same opportunity to 
brief and argue the issue to us. For these reasons, we will 
allow the parties to present the issue to the trial court hearing 
this case on remand. It is a critical issue which may be 
dispositive. It should be decided before any retrial is held." 
Id, supra, p. 324. It is also most noteworthy this decision 
deprived Breeden to the earlier award of attorney's fees, as "the 
court did not reach that issue because of the need to remand. 
When the other issues are decided below, the court can determine 
entitlement to attorney fees under the provisions of the note. 
Id, 324. 
There can be no more material fact than this blatant 
dispute, one party asserting the Notice requirement for an Accord 
and Satisfaction had been met by his habit and practice to mail 
the check, and the other flatly denying that fact. See 
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especially on the credibility of the Respondent when he 
conveniently writes: "Dear Tom: Please find enclosed a copy of my 
final payment check # 4 6 9  for $15,00 for all equipment contained 
within Apples Mobile Catering." The letter is addressed to Mr. 
O'Dell In Arco, Idaho; this court should take Judicial Notice 
that this is not proper service or notice, as there is not even a 
proper address as might have been done through a General 
Delivery. Not having a trial deprives all opportunities at cross 
examination to Appellant, besides being inconsistent with the 
rules cited. 
The Appellant, also, is in Custer County and at all times 
relevant to these issues, and as evinced by Respondent's own 
"affidavit" at page 47 CRA, from the Bankruptcy filing, showing 
the Appellant's residences for the past 8 years, all in Custer 
County, Mackay, Idaho, and that at the time of the filing of the 
has resided at 501 South Main, Mackay Idaho 83251. This clearly 
contradict his own exhibit C, p. 155 CRA, which purports to show 
attempts at notice; this is not even a Good Faith Attempt at 
that, as Appellant has always been in Custer County, and the 
letter in this exhibit is mailed to an address only reading Arco, 
Idaho; but this red flag warning is completely ignored by the 
trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should properly have been granted against Respondent's 
complaint for delivery of the titles and for the Respondent to 
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pay Appellant the balance due on the contract; Respondent's 
Motion for summary Judgment should have been denied, and the 
decision by the lower Court granting summary judgment should be 
reversed, and the matter remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with the arguments set forth herein. 
d 
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